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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANY PYLE d/b/a BOX OFFICE ] 
ENTERTAINMENT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RALPH McCLURE, PETE KUTULAS and 
WILLIAM DUNN, SALT LAKE COUNTY ; 
COMMISSIONERS, and VAUGHN 
FOTHERINGHAM, Salt Lake County ] 
License Assessor, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 14780 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent initiated this action in the lower 
court to obtain a writ of review of the suspension by the Board 
of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County of her business license 
to operate a booking placement agency for professional dancers in 
Salt Lake County* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a license revocation or suspension hearing was held 
on July 8, 1976, the Board of County Commissioners voted to suspend 
plaintiff-respondentfs business license for (1) instructing two 
female dancers to procure false identification and present it to the 
Sheriff's Office to obtain a professional dancerfs license, and (2) 
furnishing, booking, or otherwise engaging the services of two female 
dancers to work in a bar, tavern, cabaret, or private club, who at 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the time of such booking or employment had not obtained a valid 
license. Plaintiff-respondent then petitioned the lower court 
for a writ of review of the suspension of her business license, 
and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order pending the 
outcome of the hearing as to whether a preliminary restraining order 
should issue pending a decision on the merits. The hearing regard-
ing the issuance of a preliminary restraining order was continued 
pending the filing of the certified record of the hearing before 
the Board of County Commissioners. Salt Lake County filed the 
certified record of the hearing and moved for summary judgment based 
on the record. The lower court then ruled at the hearing regarding 
the issuance of a preliminary restraining order that a permanent 
injunction should be granted requiring Salt Lake County to rein-
state respondent's business license because, 1) the Salt Lake County 
Commission acted outside their authority in suspending respondent's 
license, and 2) their actions were arbitrary and capricious. 
Salt Lake County moved to amend the judgment to make the 
license suspension contingent upon the outcome of the appeal, and 
to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court. The lower court 
granted appellant's motion to amend the judgment to make the license 
reinstatement order contingent upon the outcome of the appeal, and 
denied appellant's motion challenging the lower court's jurisdiction. 
Appellants then filed this appeal challenging the lower court's 
review of the certified record of the suspension hearing before the 
Board of County Commissioners. 
2 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
granting of a permanent injunction requiring Salt Lake County to 
reinstate respondent's business license. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Effective January 1, 1976, the Board of County Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County established by ordinance the procedures to suspend 
or revoke a business license or permit issued by Salt Lake County. 
These procedures provide for notice of the time and place of the 
hearing, and the grounds for the suspension or revocation of the 
business license be served on the licensee: 
Sec. 11-8-3. Notice of Hearing. The county commission 
shall send the licensee at least 20 days written notice 
in care of the process agent specified in the license 
application of the licenseefs right to a hearing, the 
consequences of failure to appear and answer, the date, 
time and place set for the hearing, and shall include 
a copy of the charges, drafted by the county attorney, 
which have been filed against him. V 
The licensee is then afforded an opportunity at the hearing 
to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments 
on his behalf. A record is made of the hearing, upon which the 
Board is to base it's decision: 
Sec. 11-8-5. Decision of the Commission. The 
decision of the commission shall be in writing and 
shall be based only upon the evidence produced at 
the hearing. If judicial review of the Commission's 
decision is taken by the licensee, the licensee shall 
serve a copy of the complaint seeking judicial review 
with both the commission and the appropriate court. 
The commission shall promptly certify a copy of the 
record of hearing to the Reviewing Court. 
Citations from Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, 
as amended, unless otherwise indicated. 
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The grounds for suspending or revoking all county business 
licenses are also delineated by ordinance as part of the suspension 
procedures: 
Sec. 11-8-1. Revocation. In addition to any 
fine imposed, every license or permit issued by 
the county commission may be revoked or suspended 
as prescribed herein, unless another section of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County requires a 
different revocation procedure. Upon recommendation 
of the license director and upon notice and hearing, 
the county commission may revoke or suspend a license 
if the licensee: 
(a) Has been convicted of a felony or any crime 
involving moral turpitude; 
(b) Has obtained a license by fraud or deceit; 
(c) Has failed to pay personal property taxes or 
other required fees; 
(d) Has violated the laws of the State of Utah or 
the ordinances of Salt Lake County governing operation 
of the businesses holding the license or permit, or 
(e) Has refused to permit officers or employees 
authorized to make the inspection, or to take a sample 
of a commodity; or has interfered with such officer or 
employee, while in the performance of his duty, in 
making such inspection. 
Pursuant to Sec. 11-8-1(d) above, a Hearing was scheduled 
for July 8, 1976, and Notice of the Grounds for Suspension of the 
Business License of Tiffany Allen Pyle d/b/a Box Office Entertain-
ment was served on licensee. The grounds for suspending or revoking 
respondents business license were: 1) that Ms. Pyle instructed 
two of her performers to procure false identification and present 
it as a condition of employment to the Sheriff's Office as part of 
their background investigations to obtain a professional dancer's 
license by impersonating another individual contrary to Section 
4 
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76-8-508, I! C A,, 1953, ;is nmonclod , ami :•'i fh.ti Ms IPy 1 < 
furnished, booked or otherwise engaged the services of two dancers 
to work in taverns, bars, cabarets, and r ; ^ f^ 
t. line of such bookings or employment did :. i f^ ve valid County 
professional dancer's licenses contrary t- ? M P I >, Chapter 10A-1 
(Notice o Hearing, ;^ 24)
 v 
License suspension hearing, trie > 
^:- * i : . :i -^i. - : Griggs a performer of respondent, 
was instructed b. respondent to procure false identification and 
present * * u> ment agreement, to the 
Sheriff ; )ffice, d n4 o i: her background investigation to obtain 
a professional dancer's license by impersonating another individual 
(Minute " :i nstructi on by respondent that her per-
former, Kaleen Griggs, should, as a condition *: : ; r placement 
agreement, procure false identification -<-.-. ;
 ( - H 
Office, as part of her background investigation to obtain a pro-
fessional dancer's license by impersonating another individual, is 
cnnLnirv In Portion 'h-R-SOiS II ( A \lilt\ u, amended, *r.. ~ 
reads: 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness - Retaliation 
against witness or informant - Bribery, A person 
is guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted 
he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or 
(b) Withold any testimony, information, 
document or thing; or 
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Respondent, knowing that Kaleen Griggs had an invalid dancer's 
license acquired through fraud and deceit, then booked Ms. Griggs 
in various taverns in Salt Lake County contrary to Sec. 12-10A-1 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended. 
(Minutes, R. 31-32). Section 12-10A-1 reads as follows: 
Sec. 12-10A-1. License Required. (a) It shall 
be unlawful for any person to perform as a dancer for 
compensation, and for any person or agency to furnish, 
book or otherwise engage the services of a dancer for 
compensation, for or to any tavern, bar, cabaret, private 
club or association whether such performer is to be com-
pensated by wages, salary, fees or other compensation, 
without having first obtained a license therefor. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person or agency 
to knowingly furnish, book or to otherwise engage the 
services of any dancer for compensation in or for any 
tavern, bar, cabaret, private club or association who 
at the time of such booking or employment has not 
obtained a license in accordance with subsection (a) 
hereof. 
The evidence was also ^incontroverted that Holly Michelle 
Lucas, another performer of respondent was instructed by respondent 
to procure false identification and present it, as a condition of 
her placement agreement, to the Sheriff's Office, as part of her 
background investigation to obtain a professional dancer's license 
by impersonating another individual (Minutes, R. 34-35). The 
instruction by respondent that her performer, Holly Michelle Lucas, 
should, as a condition of her placement agreement, procure false 
identification to present to the Sheriff's Office, as part of her 
background investigation to obtain a professional dancer's license 
by impersonating another individual, is contrary to Section 76-8-
508, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. Respondent, knowing that Ms. Lucas 
6 
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1 laci an i n v al id dancer's ] icense, acquired through fraud and deceit, 
then booked Ms. Lucas i n various taverns in Salt Lake f mmi ,» i nn-
trary to .Sc/t; 12 •• 10/ \ 1 of I lie Revised Ordinances of Sail Lake County, 
1966, as amended. (Minutes, R '\b) 
The hearing was then closed :ui^e-
TDJCIK (Minulrs, 14 'i{Jl C- ; •- 'o \ .-• - tj:e Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County voted to suspend respondex 
license mil i I HIP en J of ' ^ * - . 
Findings of Fact and an Order suspending respondent's business 
license for four months and 22 days unti 1 December '/l, i4/h, <s 
thtm .-, LgntJ on Angus L u, 14/6 (Findings of Fact and Order, - •'*""* 
A verified petition for extraordinary relief to review the actions 
of the Board of County Commi .ssiorirr.s was; t i I od j.n District Court 
August 1 3, 14 76 (K /!) The lower court then reviewed the actions 
of * he Board of County Commissioners, and oiu<r* 
rei -v-ident1 - siness license" (Older and Extraordinary Wri • R. 77). 
Appellants then filed this appeal on September 21, 1976 (Notice of 
Appea , R. 94). ".,"" -
i»»s background for this case, the Court should note that Salt 
Lake County enacted, pursuant to Sec. 32-4-'I ?, U.CA,, J1 )^*'!, „ni 
amended, Sec. 16-lh-iS nf i he Rovir.ed Or tances of Salt Lake County 
limiting the areas in which under-age performers could be in a 
tavern which sells alcoholic beverages ±UJ.S M m-.-* , >^ u . 
to air : ; .>• i . . , -H provisions rf Sec. 32-7-15 and 15 < 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, which prohibits sales to, purchases by, 
7 
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or consumption of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of 
21 years. The County ordinance reads: 
"Sec. 16-16-8. Permitting Minors on Premises -
Minors Entering Premises. Any licensee of a place licensed 
to sell or serve beer or alcoholic beverages who permits a 
person under the age of twenty-one years to enter and 
remain in the licensed premises without lawful business 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person under the age of 
twenty-one years who enters and remains in the licensed 
public premises without lawful business therein is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
This section shall not be construed to prohibit minors 
from eating meals in a restaurant when the primary business 
of the restaurant is the serving of meals. 
This section shall not apply to a person between the 
ages of 18 and 21 years if the sole purpose of that person's 
presence in the premises is that of a bona fide employee, 
or independent contractor, hired as an entertainer, and he 
is carrying out his responsibilities as an entertainer in 
the premises where beer or alcoholic beverages are served; 
and provided that such "entertainer11 shall not co-mingle 
.with guests or patrons where beer or alcoholic beverages 
are being served or consumed; and provided further that 
such person therefore obtains and keeps on his person 
a special permit from the Board of County Commissioners, 
which authorizes him to work in such capacity. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
SUPREME COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
IN CASES INVOLVING HIGH PREROGATIVES, 
RIGHTS AND FRANCHISES OF THE STATE 
The District Court has concurrent jurisdiction under Sec. 78-
3-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended with the Supreme Court under Sec. 78-
2-2, U.C.Ac, to issue writs of review. Where a case involves high 
prerogatives, rights, and franchises of the state and its political 
subdivisions, however, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction, 
8 
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See People ex. rel: Graves vs. District Court of Second Judicial 
District, " ~ 1 '•'" -' V 87 T' P -r" (1906), In this instance 
case wherein the va i • • • es piivern i"i i ; 
business licenses are in issue, and there are no issuer of fact in 
dispute, the Supreme Court should exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
\ssue writs o.f review This is particularly true i n tho ^a^e ^f 
icense suspension where the necessary delays in first applying 
Lu the lower court and the review of its decision on appr- : , r - va-
such as to render the remedy essentially useless, unless :\* higher 
court will exercise its original jurisdiction; State ex. rIL i DLu^i 
vs. Fabrick, 1 1 N¥ 860 (] 908); State ex, rel. Howells 
vs. Metcalf, : SD 393, 100 NW 923 (1904) 
Appeallants, therefore, strongly urge the Cuurt LU ex^n 
exclusive 'jurisdiction to issue writs of review ^f hearings suspending 
revoking County business licenses; especially where • h<- practice of 
Liie lower coi irt 1 s tc grant ex parte temporary restrai ni i ig orders" • 
without notice to opposing counsel, negating the effect of the suspen-
sion or revocation :-v*-.- though counsel is in the same uildinr as 
the courl „ .ninil . --f of over forty-two attorneys able r : 
appear in opposition the issuance of the restraining order. 
POINT ii 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THE 
SUPENSION OF RESPONDENT'S LICENSE 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
\The lower coi lr I: ei: red i n :i :\ il ing tl t a t : t h * I : . •:•: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
missioners acted arbitrarily and capricously in revoking respon-
I 
dent's business license. Respondent was served with prior notice 
of the hearing outlining the grounds for suspension (R. 24). Licensee 
appeared on the hearing date in person, was represented by counsel, 
I 
and was afforded the opportunity of cross-examining witnesses, and 
presenting evidence (R. 27-40). As stated in McQuillan, Municipal 
Corporations § 26.89, 
i 
"Without doubt, a license can be revoked on 
notice and after hearing for sufficient cause. . . 
Notice in an administrative proceeding to 
revoke a license or permit must comply with all 
legal requirements and, generally speaking, it 
should state the time, place and purpose of the j 
hearing; if it does this, it is due process." 
Also, see Terri Anne Peatross dba Heidi's Massage v. Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake County, et. al. U. 2d , P2d 
Court nos. 14325 and 14265 (1976) 
Further, the following uncontroverted testimony presented at 
the hearing substantiates the Board of County Commissioners' find-
ings that respondent violated the laws of the State of Utah and the 
ordinances of Salt Lake County regulating professional dancer 
booking agents, which is all that a reviewing court may examine, 
see Denver and R»G.W.R. Co. vs. Central Water Sewer Improvement 
District, 4 U2d 105, 287 p.2d 884 (1955). 
Finding number 4 (R. 47) that respondent encouraged one of 
her dancers to provide false information to the Sheriff's official 
investigation; contrary to Sec. 76-8-508, U.C.A. , 1953, as amended, 
is supported by the record as follows: 
10 
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Mr. Theodore asked what was discussed at that time. 
Miss Griggs answered, Mrs. Pyle told her she would have to 
work on getting some false ID if she wanted to dance. 
Mr. Theodore asked if she initiated the conversation regard-
ing the use of false identification. 
Miss Griggs answered, Mrs. Pyle told her she would have to get 
some and Miss Griggs asked her how she should do it, how she should 
go about getting it. 
Mr. Theodore asked why Mrs. Pyle indicated that she would have 
to have false ID. 
Miss Griggs answered, because Mrs. Pyle knew she was under age 
and that she would have to have it in order to dance. 
Mr. Theodore asked that if, in order to dance in the establish-
ment, she would have to have false ID. 
Miss Griggs answered, yes. 
Mr. Theodore asked if, at that time, Mrs. Pyle discussed with 
her how to acquire the false identification. 
Miss Griggs answered, yes, Mrs. Pyle did. 
Mr. Theodore asked what the instructions were that she was 
given. 
Miss Griggs answered, Mrs. Pyle told her to try to find a 
driver*s license that looked similar to her that she could get 
away with using,the photo. 
Mr. Theodore asked what she was to do with the drivers license. 
Miss Griggs answered, take it up to the Police Department and 
get her dancing license. 
Mr. Theodore asked if she subsequently acquired a driverfs 
license. 
Miss Griggs answered, she found one and took it up to Mrs. 
Pyle's house. She and her mother went up to Mrs. Pyle1s house. 
Miss Griggs showed it to Mrs. Pyle, and she said it wouldn't pass. 
So Miss Griggs asked Mrs. Pyle what she wanted her to do. Mrs. 
Pyle gave her the name of a girl to call and see about going and 
11 
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applying for a driver's license. 
See Minutes (R,29, 30) 
Finding number 11 (R. 48) that respondent encouraged a second 
dancer to provide false information to the Sheriff's official in-
vestigation; contrary to Sec. 76-8-508, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
is supported by the record as follows: 
Mr. Theodore asked her how old she was. 
Miss Lucas answered, 20. 
Mr. Theodore asked if, at that time, there was any discussion 
made regarding her age, that she would have to apply for a con-
ditional license. 
Miss Lucas answered, on the next day she went over and talked 
to her and she said that before she could hire her, she would have 
to have identification that she was 21. 
Mr. Theodore asked what the reason was for that. 
Miss Lucas answered, just because you can't be in a bar if 
you are not 21. 
. . . (Minutes, R. 34) 
Mr. Theodore asked if, at: that time, she was instructed that 
she would have to have an unrestricted license showing that she 
was 21. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes. 
Mr. Theodore asked if she asked Mrs. Pyle about acquiring 
false identification or had any conversation at all on this. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes. She just asked her how she was 
to go about getting this. She really did not say much except that 
she gave her a girl's phone number and said she would give her all 
the details. 
Mr. Theodore asked if Mrs. Pyle indicated at that time that 
she would have to acquire false identification. 
12 
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Miss Lucas stated, yes, she knew that she would have to. 
Mr. Theodore asked if, when Mrs. Pyle gave her the phone 
number, Mrs. Pyle said anything about these people telling her 
how or why. 
Miss Lucas answered yes. She just said that it was an easy 
process, that all she did was go up to the Driver's License Bureau 
and use another name, someone who was 21. 
Mr. Theodore asked if she then gave her the phone number of 
the individual who could help her. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes. 
Mr. Theodore asked what the name of the individual she con-
tacted was. 
Miss Lucas answered that she told her her first name was 
Penny. 
Mr. Theodore asked if she subsequently talked to Penny about 
acquiring false identification. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes. 
(Minutes, R. 34, 35) 
Finding number 7 (R. 48) that respondent booked one of her 
dancers using an invalid professional dancer's license acquired 
through fraud and deceit to work in bars, taverns and private clubs 
contrary to Sec. 12-10A-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County is supported on the record by the following testimony: 
Mr. Theodore asked if she had any.discussion with Mrs. Pyle 
regarding employment after she received her license. 
Miss Griggs answered, at a place called Bill's Lounge, in 
Magna. She stated she did work a week before that without her 
license. 
Mr. Theodore asked if she did this with Mrs. Pyle's knowledge. 
Miss Griggs answered, yes. 
Mr. Theodore asked if Mrs. Pyle knew she didn't have the license 
at that time. 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
Miss Griggs answered, yes. 
Mr. Theodore asked where that was that she was working. 
Miss Griggs answered, Aggie's Club. 
Mr. Theodore asked if that is a tavern. 
( 
Miss Griggs answered, it's a private club. 
Mr. Theodore asked if it's a private club in Salt Lake County. 
Miss Griggs answered, yes, 
See Minutes (R. 31). 
Finding number 12 (R. 48) that respondent booked another one 
of her dancers using an invalid professional dancer's license acquired 
through fraud and deceit to work in bars, taverns and private clubs 
contrary to Sec. 12-10A-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County is supported on the record by the following testimony: 
Mr. Theodore asked if, once she got the County license with its 
false identification, she contacted Mrs. Pyle regarding employment. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes. 
Mr. Theodore asked what her understanding was, that she was an 
employee of Mrs. Pyle, or if Mrs. Pyle was her booking agent. 
Miss Lucas answered that she just thought that Mrs. Pyle was her 
boss; that was her understanding all along. 
Mr. Theodore asked if Mrs. Pyle subsequently booked her into 
various taverns. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes, she did. 
Mr. Theodore asked her what some of the names of those taverns 
were. 
Miss Lucas answered, the Phoenician, the Hawk's Lair, Farrell's; 
a whole bunch of different ones. 
Mr. Theodore stated, at that time, Mrs. Pyle knew that she had 
acquired the County unrestricted business license with false identifi-
cation. 
Miss Lucas answered, yes, right. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Consequently, where respondent was afforded notice of a 
hearing, outlining the grounds for suspension, an opportunity to 
present her cause, and evidence was subsequently presented before 
the Board of County Commissioners which sustained its judgment, 
the lower court erred in ruling the suspension of respondent's 
license arbitrary and capricious. See Denver & R.G.W.G. Co. v. 
Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., supra. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE GENERAL ORDINANCE CONTAINING THE 
GROUNDS FOR REVOKING ALL BUSINESS 
LICENSES DID NOT APPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
BUSINESS LICENSE 
Respondent's review of the suspension of her business license 
is limited to an extraordinary writ as provided under Rule 65B U.R.C.P. 
Terri Anne Peatross dba Heidi's Massage v. Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County, et al. supra. Rule 65B, U.R.C.P. abolishes 
the old forms of extraordinary writs, but retains the substanslve 
elements necessary for judicial review. Consequently, respondent's 
writ of review, in substance, corresponds to the former writ.of 
certiorai; whereby the reviewing court is limited to determine if 
the finder of fact has acted (1) without jurisdiction, or (2) 
in excess of jurisdiction, or where it appears on the face of the 
record proper that the trial court rendered a judgment which it 
had no right in law to render, McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, 
§49.70, p. 341. The basis for the lower court's ruling granting 
respondent's petition for review as that on the face of the record 
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the Board of County Commissioners could not rely on the grounds 
for revocation contained in § 11-8-1 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake County, which applies to all business licenses, but must 
rely upon the provisions of § 12-10A-7 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake County, which purportedly deals specifically with 
business licenses granted.to professional dancers and professional 
dance agencies (Finding of Fact, R. 82). Opposing counsel made his 
argument at the July 8, 1976 license suspension hearing by citing 
several repealed ordinances as a basis for challenging the Board 
of County Commissioner's authority to suspend plaintiff's business 
license. After citing the repealed provisions of Section 11-8-1 
containing the former grounds for revoking a business license, counsel 
was provided with copies of the present ordinances in effect, and 
upon which the county was relying to suspend or revoke respondent's 
business license (Minutes, R„ 27). Counsel then argued that a 
Section 12-10A-7 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County requires 
a conviction before a booking agent's license may be revoked, and 
quoted the provisions: 
Sec. 12-10A-7. Violations. Any performer or 
agency violating the provisions of this ordinance 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon con-
viction shall suffer a revocation of his, her or 
its license, unless the County Commission shall 
deem fit to suspend said license for a period of 
time rather than to revoke said license. 
This mis-cited ordinance provision corresponds to a former ordi-
nance provision Sec, 15-10A-7 (R. 74), passed May 9, 1967, which 
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was repealed September 16, 1968, when the present provisions of 
Section 12-10A-lwere passed, see copy of Ordinance enacting Sec. 
12-10A-1, (R. 71) which further states: 
"Section 2. All prior ordinances and amendments or parts 
thereof in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.11 
The lower court, therefore, erred in ruling that the Board of County 
Commissioners must rely upon the provisions of a repealed ordinance 
rather than the current provisions of Sec. 11-8-1 as a basis for 
suspending respondent's business license. 
If there is a Section 12-10A-7 in effect, there is no conflict 
between this ordinance and the provisions of Sec. 11-8-1, et. seq. 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, which applies to all business 
licenses, unless a different procedure is specified in another 
section of the ordinances. 
"Sec. 11-8-1. Revocation. In addition to any 
fine imposed, every license or permit issued by the 
county commission may be revoked or suspended as 
prescribed herein, unless another section of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County requires a 
different revocation procedure. . ." (emphasis added) 
Since Section 12-10A-7 delineates only one of the grounds for 
suspending a professional dancer's license, there is no conflict 
between the ordinances, where the newly enacted ordinance provisions 
of Sec. 11-8-1, et. seq. provide additional grounds for revoking 
all business licenses issued by Salt Lake County. Therefore, where 
this Court has the duty to reconcile any apparent conflict between 
ordinance provisions, if possible, and to give full effect to all 
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provisions if possible, see In re YORK's Estate, 115 U. 292, 204 P. 
2d, 452 (1949), the Court: should construe the provisions of Sec. 
12-10A-7 as one of the grounds for suspension, not the sole pro-
cedure and grounds for suspension. Indeed, there are no provisions 
in Sec. 12-10A-7.specifying how a license is to be suspended or 
revoked in^the event of a. conviction. 
Finally, if Section 12-10A-7 is still in effect, and there 
is a conflict with the provisions of Section 11-8-1, ete seq., the 
former provisions of Sec. 12-10A-7 have been repealed by implication. 
"An implied repeal may also be effected when-
ever the later ordinance is so incompatible with, 
or repugnant to, the former that both cannot stand 
together in a system of laws. In such a case, the 
later ordinance is adjudged to express the legisla-
tive intention as to the subject matter, and the former 
from its irreconcilable conflict therewith is held to 
be repealed insofar as it is inconsistent with the 
later ordinance.11 
62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporation §432-; p. 837 
The Board1s suspension of plaintiff's business license pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 11-8-1 et. seq., was therefore proper, 
and the lower court erred in ruling that the general ordinance con-
taining the grounds for revoking all business licenses issued by Salt 
Lake County did not apply to respondents business license. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in retaining jurisdiction to entertain 
respondent's petition for a writ of review of the suspension of her 
business license by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County 
where there was no factual dispute between the parties. The retention 
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of jurisdiction was especially improper when the nature of the 
suspension remedy could have been rendered moot by the delay in 
the lower court's decision of the issues of the case. 
The lower court further erred in ruling that the suspension 
of respondent's business license was arbitrary and capricious, 
where respondent was afforded notice of the hearing outlining the 
grounds for suspension, an opportunity to present her cause, and 
evidence was subsequently presented before the Board of County 
Commissioners which sustained its judgment that respondent had vio-
lated the ordinances of Salt Lake County,, Consequently the decision 
of the lower court granting a permanent injunction requiring Salt 
Lake County to reinstate respondent's business license should be 
reversed. 
_ Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Donald Sawaya 
Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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